Consider a hypothetical founder who decides the company should raise $1 million.

The number feels achievable. It sounds appropriate for the stage. It may even match what other brands are raising.

Then the financial model shows that inventory deposits, launch costs, operating losses and the minimum cash cushion require $1.5 million.

Reducing the ask to $1 million does not reduce the company’s cash requirement. It creates another fundraising process several months earlier, often before the business reaches the milestones that were supposed to support the next valuation.

The operating plan and its cash requirements should produce the raise amount. Starting with a convenient number and forcing the assumptions to fit it only hides the eventual shortfall.

I have led equity raises, debt raises and refinancing processes ranging from a few hundred thousand dollars to approximately $5 million. I built the models and investor decks, participated in the presentations and follow-up calls, prepared the data rooms and coordinated financial, legal, operational, quality and commercial due diligence.

The investors ranged from existing owners and board members to individuals, family offices, private investor groups and institutional capital providers. Their styles differed, but the serious ones were trying to answer the same question:

If the company receives this capital, does management understand what has to happen next, what can go wrong and when the money runs out?

In my own raises, the amount we started with often turned out to be wrong. It was harder to raise than we hoped, too small for the plan we were describing, or both. The model made that tension visible before the company committed to the full operating plan.

The investor story should lead with revenue growth and a credible path to profitability. The model then has to prove that the company can finance the path between them.

The forecast will be wrong. Investors still need it.

No credible investor expects a five-year CPG forecast to unfold exactly as presented. Retailer decisions move. Launch dates slip. Velocity changes. Ingredient costs rise. A promotion performs differently than expected.

The model still matters because investors want to understand how the business works.

They want to see:

  • Where revenue growth comes from
  • How much of that revenue the company actually retains
  • What inventory and working capital the growth requires
  • When gross margin improves and what supports that improvement
  • How long the capital lasts
  • Which milestones the round is expected to fund
  • What happens when important assumptions miss

When an investor says, “We both know this forecast will be wrong,” management should explain which assumptions carry the most risk, how and why they may move, and what those changes do to the company.

The model gives the conversation a structure. Without it, the investor is being asked to finance a story without seeing the operating system underneath it.

Build the detail where it can still be defended

I built the annual forecast by month so seasonality, launch timing, inventory purchases and cash requirements remained visible. The first two years carry the most operating detail. Years three through five help show direction, but they should not be treated with the same precision.

That longer view still has value. It shows whether the strategy eventually produces the scale, margins and profitability management is selling. It should not disguise uncertainty with five years of perfectly smooth growth.

Start with the revenue engine, not a growth percentage

A claim that revenue will grow 80% next year tells an investor the destination but nothing about how the company gets there.

For a CPG company, core retail accounts should be built from the operating drivers:

Doors × units per store per week × selling weeks × brand sell-in price

The forecast should then reflect:

  • Expected promotional weeks
  • Incremental lift during promotions
  • Launch timing by account
  • Distribution-center rollout timing
  • Seasonality
  • Expected deductions and trade spend
  • Discontinuations or lost distribution

Existing core customers deserve a bottom-up build. Smaller accounts can be grouped by distributor or channel when the additional detail would not improve the decision.

New accounts require probability and timing. A promising buyer meeting should not appear in the base case at 100% of its theoretical annual value. The model should show the expected door count, units per store per week, launch date and probability of winning the business.

The company’s invoiced customer may be UNFI or KeHE, so distributor purchases drive the revenue forecast. Retailer sell-through validates whether that forecast is sustainable. Confusing shipments into distribution with consumer demand produces a model that looks strongest just before the reorders disappoint.

This distinction is especially important when a large retailer creates an attractive headline. Costco, Walmart or another national account may offer meaningful revenue and still require more inventory, launch spending and cash than the company can support.

The founder’s job is to make investors see the opportunity. The model has to show what the opportunity costs.

Gross revenue cannot fund the business

A fundraising model that jumps from gross sales to COGS is incomplete.

Trade promotions, off-invoice allowances, slotting, free fills, distributor programs, returns, markdowns and operational deductions all reduce what the company retains. Across the grocery programs I managed, total gross-to-net costs generally averaged 20% to 25% of gross revenue, with expansion periods sometimes running higher.

Those costs also arrive at different times. A promotion may occur in March and be deducted from a distributor remittance in May. Slotting may consume most of a payment the company expected to use for inventory. The model needs both the P&L impact and the cash timing.

When company history is limited, use category experience and industry benchmarks, then make the assumption visible and adjustable. A low trade-spend assumption should not be used simply because it helps the margin reach the desired result.

The underlying gross-to-net reporting should eventually replace the initial benchmark with the company’s own customer and program history.

COGS improvements need an operating explanation

Most fundraising models show gross margin improving. Some of that improvement is reasonable. Larger production runs can reduce processing costs. Packaging volumes can improve purchasing power. Freight and ingredient contracts can be renegotiated.

The base case should distinguish between three levels of confidence:

  1. Confirmed savings: supported by a vendor quote, contract or scheduled operational change.
  2. Planned savings: management has identified the action and has a credible path to execute it.
  3. Aspirational savings: possible at scale, but unsupported today.

Confirmed savings belong in the base case. Planned savings should remain visible as an operating initiative or sensitivity, but the base case should not depend on them until they are confirmed. Aspirational savings belong in the upside case.

“COGS decline by five points as we scale” will not survive serious diligence unless management can explain which ingredients, packaging components, production rates or freight lanes create the improvement.

Growth creates a working-capital requirement before it creates cash

The P&L may show an attractive retailer launch while the cash forecast shows the company running out of money.

Inventory deposits may be due months before the launch. Ingredients and packaging have different lead times and minimum quantities. Production has to occur before shipment. The distributor may pay weeks later and deduct promotions or launch costs from the remittance.

I have seen the P&L show an attractive launch while the cash forecast showed the company reaching its lowest point before the first meaningful collection. The model has to connect inventory purchases, supplier terms, customer collections, distributor deductions, debt service and minimum liquidity to the P&L. Otherwise it describes profit while ignoring whether the company can finance it.

A 13-week cash flow forecast manages the immediate operating decisions. The fundraising model shows whether the capital structure can support the larger plan.

The raise amount should fall out of the model

The amount requested should fund a defined operating plan through a meaningful set of milestones. It should also include the cost of raising the capital and a cash cushion appropriate for the company’s risk tolerance.

Consider a simplified hypothetical CPG raise:

Use of funds Amount
Inventory, packaging and supplier deposits $450,000
Slotting, free fills and launch promotions $200,000
Operating losses before the targeted milestone $500,000
Equipment, systems and other capital expenditures $125,000
Legal, diligence and fundraising costs $75,000
Minimum cash cushion at the forecast low point $250,000
Total cash requirement $1,600,000
Less: cash available to fund the plan ($100,000)
Required raise $1,500,000

The arithmetic is straightforward: $1.6 million of required cash less $100,000 already available leaves a $1.5 million financing need.

If management decides to ask for $1 million because $1.5 million sounds difficult, the company still has a $500,000 gap. The plan has to change. Management can reduce the launch, delay hiring, renegotiate commitments, change the milestone or accept another financing process. Pretending the gap disappeared is not an option.

Raising too little can be especially damaging when the round carries a high valuation. If the company needs additional capital before proving the next milestone, investors may no longer support that valuation, leaving the company to accept a flat or down round, additional dilution or both.

Use of funds should describe outcomes, not accounting categories

A use-of-funds slide showing “40% inventory, 30% marketing and 30% payroll” tells an investor where the money will be spent. Investors also need to see what the spending is expected to accomplish.

A stronger use-of-funds schedule connects capital to milestones:

  • Fund inventory and launch support for specific committed distribution
  • Reach a defined level of recurring retail velocity
  • Improve gross margin through named sourcing or production initiatives
  • Build the team required to support the next operating stage
  • Reach cash-flow breakeven or a defined monthly burn rate
  • Extend runway through the period needed to prove those results

The next round does not need to be presented as a scheduled event. The model should instead show the milestones that make future financing optional, easier or more valuable.

A real downside case changes the decisions

Reducing revenue by 10% and leaving every other assumption untouched is not a serious downside case.

The model should support a base case, downside case, delayed-launch case, lower-velocity case, higher-COGS case and reduced-funding case. These do not require six disconnected spreadsheets. They require a flexible model whose core assumptions can be changed without breaking the logic.

CPG problems compound. Lower velocity leaves more inventory on hand. The next production run may still be required because of minimum quantities. Promotions may increase in an attempt to improve sell-through. Retailer payments and distributor deductions may arrive later than expected. Gross margin and cash deteriorate together.

At minimum, the model should allow management and investors to change:

  • Launch probability and timing
  • Door count
  • Units per store per week
  • Promotional lift and frequency
  • Gross-to-net percentage
  • COGS and expected savings
  • Inventory days
  • Customer collection timing
  • Supplier payment timing
  • Amount and timing of capital raised

Some investors will review only the base and downside outputs. Others will hand the file to an associate who changes every core assumption. A flexible model is easier to defend because the logic remains visible when the assumptions move.

The upside case can live in the data room. It rarely belongs at the center of the deck. Investors already understand that management believes in the upside. The model earns credibility by showing that the company has considered the downside.

The deck, model and data room must describe the same company

Every financial claim in the investor deck should reconcile to the model.

The common breaks occur around:

  • New-account revenue
  • Launch timing
  • Gross-margin improvement
  • Cash runway
  • Use of funds
  • Path to profitability

A deck may show an account launching in April while the model assumes January. The deck may advertise a 45% gross margin while the model reaches it only after unconfirmed savings. The use-of-funds slide may omit the working-capital buildup that creates most of the cash need.

Those inconsistencies make investors question everything else.

The model should not be rewritten every few days to chase investor reactions. Update it when the business changes materially or when someone identifies an actual error. While the raise remains open, compare actual results with the forecast. A material variance can be explained; an unexplained drift makes the model look like sales material rather than a management tool.

The data room should be substantially ready before the company goes to market. Early conversations may begin with a teaser, historical financials and a limited set of supporting documents. Once interest becomes serious, management should be prepared to provide the model, cap table, corporate records, material contracts, customer information, quality and regulatory documentation, intellectual property records and other diligence materials appropriate to the transaction.

Preparing the data room during diligence slows the process and exposes problems in real time. Preparing it beforehand gives management a chance to reconcile discrepancies before an investor finds them.

The fastest ways to lose financial credibility

In my experience, three problems damage credibility fastest:

  1. The raise amount came before the operating plan. The assumptions were reverse-engineered to make a convenient number appear sufficient.
  2. The growth story has no operating build. New accounts are treated as certain, and revenue is disconnected from doors, velocity, timing and gross-to-net.
  3. The model cannot explain cash. Margin improves without support, working capital disappears, or the deck and model show different versions of the plan.

Knowing every formula is unnecessary. The founder must still explain the revenue plan, the runway, the critical assumptions and what a change in those assumptions does to the company.

Sophisticated investors will test the model

Product founders do not always have the background to build an integrated fundraising model themselves. That is normal. Facing sophisticated investors without a strong finance partner is still a mistake.

Accurate historical accounting is necessary, but it does not build the forward-looking plan. The finance partner also needs experience modeling CPG revenue, trade spend, inventory, working capital and retailer-launch economics.

The right finance partner should be able to:

  • Build the integrated operating and financial model
  • Challenge commercial and operational assumptions
  • Size the raise from the company’s actual cash requirements
  • Create useful base and downside scenarios
  • Reconcile the deck, use of funds and runway
  • Prepare the financial portion of the data room
  • Help management answer investor questions without taking over the founder’s story

I have also rejected capital when the interest rate, valuation and resulting dilution, control rights, other terms or counterparty created more risk than the money solved. A strong model does not automatically make a financing offer attractive. It gives management enough visibility to evaluate the trade.

Capital should fund a plan management can defend

Investors know the forecast will change. They still expect management to understand the economics of the business and the risks attached to their capital.

If a company is asking for seven figures, building a defensible model is part of being careful with that money. The model should show how the business grows, where the cash goes, how long it lasts, what milestones it funds and how the financial outcome changes when reality differs from the plan.

Netter Group helps growing CPG companies build fundraising models, pressure-test operating assumptions, size capital needs, prepare data rooms and defend the financial plan with investors. For support preparing a CPG capital raise, contact julien@nettergroup.com.